Debt – and Deception
By R.F. Morrison
an abridged version
In the beginning there was barter,
then there was money,
then there was money & debt,
then there was only debt –
and deception.
March 2008
F |
or a long, long time customers have deposited money in banks and earned interest. The banks then lent the money on to other customers in the form of paper promises to ‘pay on demand’ and these customers paid a higher rate interest.
Provided the banks conducted their business responsibly they lived very well on the difference - and everyone was happy. But then the banks discovered they could create credit – that is they could lend out more paper promises than the money deposited with them – who was to know? Again, provided they were very careful and lent only against good collateral security, this was seen as fairly safe and the depositors weren’t too concerned.
And so, almost unnoticed, ‘real’ money was transformed into ‘bank promises’ and to this day the business of banking is about dealing in these promises and guarding against the risk of default. There is no ‘real’ or customers’ money involved in bank loans. However, if a borrower does default the bank has to find ‘real’ money to make up the loss from its own capital. Bank regulation is about having just enough liquid capital to balance these risks.
The biggest risk for banks is if loans default and there is a general fall in the value of the collateral which secures their loans. As their own capital is no more than ten per cent at best of the loans outstanding, a fall of these proportions would be a disaster for the entire banking industry. This tightrope is the Achilles heel of a very sophisticated risk management business.
The banks grew and grew until today they provide virtually all the Nation’s money – only three pence in every pound of all the money in circulation is cash. Everything else is bank credit and bank credit has become the means by which virtually all payments are now made.
So banks don’t really need your savings any more – at least not to lend out to their other customers. But they still offer you interest on savings accounts because they use that money for working capital and for their other businesses – making investments and lending to other banks, financing takeovers for themselves and for other corporate clients – and for funding ‘financial instruments’, ‘special investment vehicles’ and a host of other fancy names which feed that huge phenomenon called the Money Markets. This is ‘wholesale’ banking which has now become even more profitable than ‘retail’ or High Street banking.
As the catalyst of the capitalist system, modern banks are key to the enterprise economy – and even more so to the financial economy. They are engines of profit in their own right and without their finance and payments systems no significant commerce or industry could take place.
Banks are an enigma. They are seen as indispensable, yet are private corporations and a long way short of neutral social institutions. To say the least, lending non-existent money to borrowers makes for a tricky and fragile business model. Not surprisingly, the money business is volatile and unpredictable - prone to frequent seizures and hiccoughs on a daily basis. The citizens are expected to have confidence in this arrangement and indeed when it all goes a bit too wobbly, in rushes the Government with reassuring words and all the rescue apparatus of a state of emergency. The taxpayer is obliged to rally round and the shaky edifice is propped up to survive another day. Such hitches will spark off some awkward questions but usually all that is demanded is the sacrifice of a ritual goat and the money-masters return to the cauldron.
We hear much about this word ‘confidence’ required to maintain stability in financial markets. One need not look far to understand why – neither the best illusionists nor confidence tricksters can conduct confidence tricks without it. But when such performances become so built into the fabric of society that the State agrees to participate in maintaining the illusion then there is something very much amiss.
There is no space here for a detailed review of the smoke and mirrors which make up the financial markets, however take a quick look at three of the more familiar names and what they do. All have the common thread which illustrates their futility for any useful purpose whatsoever, other than to enrich the perpetrators and fleece the lieges.
Hedge funds take positions on all kinds of financial instruments, that is they gamble that they can buy an option today to take delivery at a future date when they guess the item will have grown in value and they will make a profit. They use a little of their own investors’ money but the vast bulk of the balance is borrowed from banks. By making such large purchase obligations they often create an artificial demand and actually influence the market price.
It all started when Long Term Capital Management used $2.2 billion in capital from investors as collateral to buy $125 billion in securities. Then it used those securities as collateral to enter into new financial transactions valued at $1.25 trillion. The deal went bust. However, the Federal Reserve decided that the ‘sophisticated’ investors in LTCM should not be allowed to lose their money. And so, the New York Fed brought in Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, UBS of Switzerland, J.P. Morgan and others to put up the $3.5 billion bailout. Since then there has been a column of bailouts by the Fed.
Derivatives are similar and often used by banks, e.g. buying an option that interest rates will not move against their current fixed rate contracts – in effect they hedge their position more as a precaution than as a potential profit earner. Derivatives are however also commonly used to gamble on future share and commodity prices. Derivatives can be particularly dangerous to currencies. A powerful and highly leveraged speculator can take a punt at a currency by buying into a future position so substantial that the rest of the market follows suit and the value rises or falls accordingly. The country’s economy is affected artificially and for a few weeks work the speculators pocket millions – often billions.
Collateralised Loan Obligations, the financial instruments which sank Northern Rock and started the 2007/8 ‘credit crunch’ comprise ‘bundles of loans or mortgages handed over to a subsidiary and then sold on the financial markets as securities – certificates carrying a return and having a variable value. The attraction to the bank is that it offloads its loan portfolio, receives cash from the sale and can lend out more and more without having to expand its own capital or depositors’ base. As is now well known, the problems occurred when the collateral value of houses slumped and the ‘security’ element dropped away, leaving investors with a much reduced value for their asset.
The ultimate confidence trick is of course that the billions made on the financial markets are all perfectly legitimate – only seldom is the law broken. So where does all the money come from? The answer is inflation. Bank credit finances it all and the price is paid by everyone else.
These procedures are seen as perfectly satisfactory within the banking and Treasury circles of most western countries. Self regulation of such a complex mechanism is perceived not as an option but as a necessity. The bodies which regulate banks render lip service to the Legislature but essentially they are independent and run by professional bankers for professional bankers. No government in its right mind would want to nationalise the banks, but as long as we base our means of exchange on ‘notional money’ it’s value will be abused by those in a position to control its issuance.
We hear much about this word ‘confidence’ required to maintain stability in financial markets. One need not look far to understand why – neither the best illusionists nor confidence tricksters can conduct confidence tricks without it. But when such performances become so built into the fabric of society that the State agrees to participate in maintaining the illusion then there is something very much amiss. Writing in 1936, Keynes noted, "It is enterprise which builds and improves the world's possessions.... Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on the steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubbles on a whirlpool of speculation".
At this point we should refine the term ‘borrowing.’ If we borrow from a friend, a relation, a pawnbroker or a moneylender they open their wallet and hand us their money. We can now spend that money but they can not – they have foregone the use of it until such time as we repay it. And for that sacrifice it is not unreasonable to pay interest. This process adds nothing to the ‘pot’ of money in circulation and nothing to the total ‘real wealth’ of the community; some purchasing power has changed hands – nothing else. That is how the 151 registered Building Societies worked prior to 1986 when mortgages and investments totalled £132 bn and members shares & savings also equalled £132 bn.
For many years now all commercial banks have churned out credit at a rate between three and four times the real rate of economic growth.
The UK GDP grows in real terms by three per cent a year at most, whilst the National money supply grows at a net 10% per annum. In 2007 the figure was an incremental £327 million a day. This additional credit money can attach only to existing goods and services and inflation occurs primarily when money enters circulation in volumes greater than the goods and services being traded. Like a pot of good soup, if you keep diluting it with water it ceases to be good soup. That is why inflation will continue at a rate equal to tthe difference between these percentages for as long as ‘notional’ money competes with ‘'real’ money.
A further symptom is the inexorable growth of unrepayable personal and public debt and the associated interest burden which absorbs an ever increasing share of income. Banks manufacture two products – credit and inflation. The more credit they produce the more profit they earn and remember, a steady rate of inflation does not harm banks. It facilitates the payment of interest and guards against a drop in collateral values - no bank wishes to risk its security falling below the value of the loan, and no borrower would borrow 125% of equity value in the absence of inflation.
In terms of the value of money, inflation does not concern banks either, because they live on interest. The principal - the notional money they lend does not exist in the first place, so when it is repaid at a later date its depreciated valued is academic. Nor is inflation significant to Big Business - they just put up prices. It is of some significance to small businesses because they suffer a lag between cost rises and selling prices. It is more painful to employees because wage rises are usually at least a year in catching up, and of greatest significance is the impact upon the retired generation trying to live on the fixed income of a pension.
Credit is an inexhaustible spring, a cornucopia – a licence to print money - which only backfires when a loan goes sour and the bank has to find real money to cover the loss.
So much for credit. Conversely, the long established process whereby new cash money comes into circulation is very different and best described by actual historic events. Prior to, and until just after the end of WW2, cash was the primary means of exchange among all populations. Bank accounts and financial credit were primarily for commerce and industry, and for the salaried managerial classes. In the UK one half of all money in domestic circulation was cash. As the standard of living rose so also did the need for ever more cash. This demand came via the commercial banks and the State provided them with all the cash they asked for.
Fig 1
Fig 1
Graph prepared from Abstracts of National Statistics
Fig 2
(then)
Up until the 1960’s the State maintained a large fleet of armoured vans and delivered huge sums of new cash money to the banks for distribution - matching the monetary demands of the Economy. Each delivery was credited in full to the Government Seigniorage account and thus all this currency was spent into circulation as wages and salaries for services rendered in the provision of Public Services. No interest or repayment was involved.
This money was not however a free issue to the banks – they had to account for every penny by crediting the government’s account (Fig2). The procedure is of long standing and is called seigniorage. This principle is key to restoring our money to both democratic accountability and to economic realism.
Following post war austerity in Europe the availability of household goods and consumables gradually increased faster than incomes and it became apparent that whilst these goods were available to buy there and then, most people didn’t have enough ready cash to buy them. Consumer credit – notional cash – became accepted as real cash.
As with ‘fiat money’, a credit contract with a bank (or credit card provider), was a promise to pay cash at a future date and that was enough to secure the purchase. The first Diners Club charge card appeared in America in 1950 and the first Visa and Master Cards a few years later. Hire purchase companies prospered, borrowing credit cheaply from the banks, securing their advances on the goods purchased and charging higher rates of interest than they paid.
The ascendancy of credit over cash is widely heralded as a natural evolution, just another modern convenience superseding an outdated means of exchange. This is the view of the commercial banks and, quite remarkably, also that of The Treasury.
The change however obscured a much more insidious factor – not just the demise of seigniorage but the displacement of real National money with ‘notional’ money - issued by private companies called banks.
Fig 3
Well, virtually closed. Once a source of half our money supply and provider of a substantial slice of government revenue in the nineteen fifties, cash is now some than three pence in every pound in circulation. Adding to the irony, the Royal Mint has been reduced to a metal bashing operation, selling coins, medals, jewellery, gifts and collectables under the Royal Mint Classics brand. Expected to operate commercially the Mint regularly turns in a modest loss.
This was a double edged sword. First it cut government revenues and forced the introduction of new value added taxes and excise duties, and then it cut any democratic restraint or control over inflation by handing over the National money creation function to the banks.
The banks prospered as never before as more and more credit money was churned out. The State however was unable to participate in the credit boom financed by this change. Budget deficits and public debt escalated steadily and interest payments on the UK National Debt grew to exceed £25 bns per annum.
Obsessed with how to finance deteriorating public services successive administrations raised yet more indirect taxation, excusing themselves with euphemisms like ‘modernisation’ and ‘competition’. And surely the ultimate insult to all intelligence was the ‘Private Finance Initiative’. Here we have the public borrowing credit from the selfsame banks to which they have granted this credit monopoly.
Even our most senior politicians seem unable to rationalise the relationship between their constitutional obligation to provide a fair and neutral money system and the role of banks in providing a modern payments system. If they sat down to a game of Monopoly would they permit the banker to issue ‘notional’ money and at the same time compete with the other players?
Nor are these phenomena influenced by Party politics – administrations of all political stripes are equally affected. Note the steep rise in debt sparked by Mrs. Thatcher’s ‘freeing up’ of the moneymaking activities of the City of London in 1980 (Fig 4). A government ostensibly dedicated to expanding enterprise and cutting public sector excesses – and not withstanding selling off a raft of public assets to the market - has ratcheted up even greater debt. Arithmetical certainties are not deleted by creative accounting or political zealots.
The bulk of Private Sector debt was, and remains, of the rotating variety – consumers pay off earlier purchases and apply their ‘creditworthiness’ to new ones. Despite a steadily increasing casualty rate in the form of bankruptcies and repossessions, carefully managed debt remains a satisfactory arrangement and consumers appear to be willing to pay the credit charges involved.
The National Debt (Public Sector debt) however is a different matter. It is the cumulative sum of all government deficits. It is represented by Gilt Edged Securities which are IOUs from the State for notional money borrowed from the bondholder who in turn has borrowed it from the banking system which is authorized to create notional money by the State which is the issuer of the National Currency and the ultimate monetary authority in the first place. Better read that again – it’s a long sentence in either sense.
The escalation of the National Debt – still rising each year from these budget deficits, worries central bankers. So much so that within the European Union, States are constrained to keep annual deficits to within 3% of GDP and their total National Debts to within 60% of GDP. Each year this arbitrary constraint provides a bigger and bigger challenge to State spending on infrastructure and public services and the results are clearly apparent. The prognosis is an arithmetical certainty – at the accelerating rate indicated by Fig 4. The National Debt at 2008 stands at over £600bns.
For the self interested individual in a free and democratic society consumer debt is a matter of individual choice –
Fig 4
No matter which political party is democratically elected, none makes any serious effort to reign in the private sector debt machine. The unchallenged outcome is a mathematical certainty – the entire population and its government will remain permanently and increasingly in debt to a privately owned ‘Credit Industry’
certainly a matter to be regulated by the State, but fundamentally a personal decision and responsibility.
Affordability too is a constraint which will always condition the way in which individuals behave, and using credit is part of that freedom of choice.
The State – representing this collection of self interested individuals also has a choice. It can delegate its monetary responsibilities to the private banking sector virtually as a self regulating entity, as at present, or it can elect to retain its constitutional authority over the means of exchange.
Not unnaturally, this latter option is unfashionable among banking and financial circles. They prefer the State to maintain its responsibility for the National Currency only insofar as enforcing the law protecting the banks’ monopoly and punishing counterfeiters and fraudsters. They also expect the State to guarantee the currency and its stability so that when trouble looms they will be bailed out by the taxpayer. This ‘bailing-out’ process might benefit from comment. As we all know, the State is permanently broke and on the ragged edge of balancing its budget - the Treasury has no vaults stuffed with reserves for such emergencies. A Treasury bail-out is a straightforward dilution of the money supply,i.e. inflation of the currency and is reflected in a deteriorating rate of exchange. That’s how the taxpayer pays for it.
High taxes limit and dictate public investment and financing charges dominate the private sector. At almost 30% of GDP the financial sector now governs the real economy[1]. Everyone, except the financiers, would like to see debt capped at manageable levels, inflation eliminated and a greater focus upon what can be achieved rather than what can be afforded.
The overarching principle is that all money must be real again. There are two elements to the proposal which follows. The long term objective is that all bank lending will eventually be 100% backed by the deposits of savers and investors. The second is to empower Government to finance public investment where dormant economic capacity exists.
From Day 1, the issue of notional money will become illegal. Monetary policy will require that all future increases in the National money supply will be in the National Currency and denominated in values of one million pounds sterling. Whilst the demand for additional financial credit continues, so the Bank of England will issue notes to the corresponding value. Instead of creating inflation by issuing unlimited credit money generated out of thin air, future increases in the money supply will be accounted and vouched by these interest free Seigniorage credits.
The million pound Treasury Notes will not however enter circulation, but will be retained by the commercial banking sector as non interest bearing securities underwriting all new (incremental) issues of financial credit – Fig 5. Under the well established seigniorage protocol the banks will credit the current account of the Bank of England with this deposit. There should be no more State borrowing for capital investment, nor resorting to PFI ploys. It is however restricted to domestic investment and cannot be used to finance imports without additional considerations of the Balance of Payments. That however is a quite separate issue.
The proposed ‘New Credit Money’ would come into circulation only in step with a corresponding increase in real wealth – in the form of the public assets internally created. This is the key factor in restraining inflation – no increase in money supply without an equivalent value added to the National wealth.
Fig 5
Fig 5
(in future)
The change from cash to credit should not change the principle of money as a means of exchange issued free of interest by the State. The re-introduction of Seigniorage by the Treasury would once again attach a physical asset to the creation of all new credit money thus reducing debt, the interest burden and asset inflation.
This ‘real’ money would return to the banking system in increasing volumes as wages, salaries and company profits, replacing an equivalent amount of notional bank credit and debt. Thus, all money would progressively become ‘real’ again and retail banking would return to the status of a responsible privately owned Institution. As notional money disappeared greater stability would progressively return across all sectors of the economy.
Banks would no longer require a special charter to create credit, but they would remain subject to authorisation under an Act similar to that governing Building Societies. They would however also participate in a collective guarantee for their ordinary depositors which they would fund from their own resources and which would be administered by the Regulators..
Much of the complexity surrounding the present banking system is due to mixing the Payments System with literally hundreds of other banking activities for profit. The true cost of the payment system is therefore obscured. The term ‘free banking’ (for those in credit) is of course subsidized by borrowers. The downside of this is that the ‘real’ economy is impacted by the inherent volatility of financial markets.
It is therefore recommended that retail banks be required to hive off their satellite businesses and concentrate exclusively upon retail banking operations. There is neither justification nor equity in a State banking charter which provides any private company with a financial advantage over its competitors (the Monopoly syndrome).
Retail banking will progressively return to attracting sufficient retail savings deposits to fund its retail loan book – just as Building Societies did in the recent past. The strength of Building Societies lies not in their Mutual Status or that they lend specifically for mortgages – it is that they lend ‘real’ money. Confidence will return and ‘runs on the bank’ will be greatly reduced when the public realize that ‘real’ money exists to cover their deposits.
Look again at Fig 1 on page 6. That blue line is the real increase in GDP when inflation is stripped out. Adopting this proposal would mean that the annual increase in money supply would once again be shared between bank credit and state investment – just as it has been in the past.
The disastrous pattern of excessive bank credit has been consistent since the seventies – typically in the ten years to 2003 the UK money supply increased at an average of over £53 bns a year – an average of over 7 ½ % per annum. In the same period real GDP had risen 2½ %, the result was real inflation of 5%. Over the past four years to 2007 that rate has increased to an average of 10% pa - over £100 bns a year and real GDP remains solidly stuck at less than 3% pa.
This is a game of real life Monopoly with the bank competing as a player. The bank must be neutral. Inflation will never be defeated until credit growth is controlled to match that of the real economy. Investing any increase in credit into public assets instead of pumping up private asset and house prices would be a first step along the road to keeping it in check.
A healthy banking and financial sector is desirable in any economy but the State must now recognise that it has become a monopoly dominating the very core of the democratic process. Our means of exchange is a key facilitator of trade, but it has become the genie out of the bottle. The day that we - the State – stop treating the banks as privileged private businesses will be the day capitalism and free enterprise recaptures ts roots.
A proposal of this nature would require restriction of foreign banks from circumventing the legislation and would require negotiation within the Basel Agreements on EU banking. The knee jerk reaction of the Financial Establishment will doubtless follow the usual pattern of at first ignoring the proposal, then ridiculing it, then citing at as dangerous, fascist or communist, and then threatening to up stakes and remove the entire financial sector from these shores. That does not affect the logic of the basic academic argument.
Many books and learned papers have been written on Banking and Monetary Reform; many conferences addressed and even worthy efforts to introduce legislation in Parliament and Congress. Nothing has happened because the corridors of power are stuffed with lobbyists and special interest groups resisting change. Many economists, even Milton Friedman believe it or not, have advocated reform of this nature. In his own words, like so many, he found himself ‘tilting at windmills’. He concluded that career prospects were better within the ivory rowers of Academia and the fortresses of the Establishment.
As with the abolition of slavery or votes for women, banking reform will only happen when there is a large enough swell of public opinion demanding it. Until then democracy will continue to be driven by the power of money rather than the will of the majority.
End
If you would like to know more or find out how to join a campaigning group, type in 'money as debt’ into your search engine. It’s an animated video with lots of links to international Banking Reform organisations. For the serious student go to the links page on this site for a free download of Creating New Money by James Robertson.
[1] The entire UK construction industry – building, engineering, transport infrastructure etc. is 5% of GDP